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This thesis investigates the effects of resource constraints on the United 
States Air Force Weapons School (USAFWS). Highly regarded as the Combat 
Air Force’s (CAF) Center of Excellence, the USAFWS is responsible for 
producing a weapons officer who is finely tuned in the skills of communication, 
integration of joint forces, large force mission planning, training plan 
development, and tactical leadership. The CAF demands a weapons officer who 
is highly skilled and possesses traits and values above the norm. The USAFWS 
has translated these objectives into an exemplary standard that pervades the 
institution and its graduates, and thus the CAF itself. 
During this period of transformation and global war (circa 2005), the CAF 
is continually seeking ways to “do more with less.” This thesis provides a 
framework for assessing whether this is possible without adversely affecting the 
USAFWS’s training standard. The graduate can be seen as a product of 
objectives (ends) plus training concepts (ways) plus resources (means). All three 
components are rigorously examined. Everything under the USAFWS’s control 
has been optimized, leaving the shrinking pool of resources as a troubling and 
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From a combatant commander to a B-course student, members of the 
Combat Air Forces (CAF) realize that the Weapons School makes a difference. 
The result of 100 years of aviation in America, our Air Force is without peer. Even 
so, emerging militaries are catching up at an alarming rate. Our next 
confrontation may very well challenge our skills, concepts, and resolve to win in 
the air and on the ground. As the technology gap closes and political constraints 
tighten our freedom of action, our Air Force will have little choice but to 
increasingly rely on its most distinctive advantage—our training. The ways in 
which we train determine our effectiveness in combat, and this is why every one 
of us understands the importance of the Weapons School. 
In today’s world of tightening budgets, global operations, and new weapon 
systems, every organization in the Air Force continues to try to figure out how to 
do more with less. In the case of the Weapons School, the stress induced by 
these factors has resulted in an intense review of all syllabi. However, during my 
three years as an instructor, I never saw a single phase, much less an entire 
syllabus, which was repeated intact from one iteration to the next. In an institution 
that prides itself on learning from its execution, it is alarming that measurement of 
syllabus performance can’t objectively be done. With no two consecutive 
graduates seeing the same syllabus, it is difficult to know the true quality of 
graduate being delivered to the CAF.  
These facts would seem to imply that the Weapons School is doing too 
much with too little. If so, what are the effects? This study seeks to answer this 
question by analyzing: 1) What exactly makes up the standards of the Weapons 
School? 2) Do the cadre agree that these standards are under siege? 3) What 
are the consequences for the CAF if the Weapons School produces less than 
excellent weapons officers? 4) How can the school use its system of objective 
measurement to make a case for stabilizing its training operations and improving 
its priority for resources? 
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A historical review of the Air Force’s growth helps us understand how and 
why the Weapons School is central to the CAF’s success. The Air Force 
established its training priorities early on when it gathered WWII veterans at Las 
Vegas AFB to pass down their experiences. “Gunnery Camp” was the simplest 
form of training. Seasoned fighter pilots replicated combat situations and advised 
their students how to duplicate combat success. After enough students saw 
enough situations, the cadre realized that specific skills contributed to success 
and that certain traits fostered those skills. The training methods were formalized 
in an instructional method, eventually to be named the Building Block Approach 
by then-Captain Jumper and his generation of WIC instructors. As a center for 
developing tactics and training, the Weapons School earned respect for its role. 
During Vietnam, resources were at a premium, and thus Air Force 
leadership chose to de-emphasize air-to-air training due to the risk of losing 
airplanes. Not surprisingly, the Air Force’s kill ratio sunk to 2:1 by the end of the 
conflict compared to the Navy’s 6:1. The resulting lessons-learned from Vietnam 
were that the Air Force was deficient in its formations and tactics. Since the 
Weapons School was responsible for tactics and training, reform was inevitable. 
The Weapons School’s emphasis on instructorship is a direct result of 
inadequate training methods during the Vietnam years. 
The CAF’s rise to preeminence has clearly defined the Weapons School’s 
role: demonstrate leadership in tactical and, increasingly, operational matters. 
The Weapons School additionally contributes an “operational conscience.” 
Credibility is achieved, partially, through superior skills. Those skills are a subset 
of certain traits, and those traits are duplicated by training concepts. The 
overarching idea is a system of institutional values and, for the Weapons School, 
one of those values is resolute leadership. The school’s ideal of humble, 
approachable, and credible instructors is fundamental to its idea of leadership. 
The CAF has invested heavily in the Weapons School as a “Center of 
Excellence” that develops and sustains the value system that defines our Air 
Force. Without it, excellence would quickly erode into mediocrity. 
 xv
In a simple framework for analysis, the graduate can be seen as a product 
of “Ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus Ways (courses of action) plus 
Means (instruments by which some ends can be achieved).” The CAF specifies 
the ends, or the standard of the overall graduate (further defined as core skills). 
The school creates training concepts (ways) to achieve those ends. The CAF 
contributes the means, or the resources. Jets, airspace, time, instructors, and 
students are all part of the equation. In the spirit of the Weapons School’s 
operational conscience, it seeks to refine its objectives and optimize its ways in 
order to maximize the use of resources. Since these components must be 
balanced in order to achieve the desired effect, a reduction of one results in a 
reduction of all. If the objectives decline, then there is less need for particular 
resources. Likewise, if resources are withdrawn, then the standard of 
objectives—“the bar”—must also drop. There is limited room to work around 
resource deficiencies and, as the cadre has acknowledged, that margin was 
actually erased long ago. 
The bar is a contentious issue in an institution that passionately defends 
the value of its training. If a lower standard is out of the question, yet evidence 
shows that the bar is insidiously lowering, what can result? Similar to the effect of 
induced drag on an airplane at slow airspeeds, if the pilot fails to correct with a 
rapid application of power then the aircraft will quickly stall and lose altitude. If 
the standard is the Weapons School’s altitude, the numerous distractions and 
disruptions to the syllabi its induced drag, and the flow of resources its power, 
then the school must recognize itself as being behind the power curve: The cadre 
works harder but with less effect, the school’s standard struggles to match 
expectations, and each syllabus is frayed with compromises. As in the case of 
the power curve, the Weapons School can 1) increase the work effort, 2) 
increase the resources to make current work more effective, 3) maintain the 
standard but decrease output, or 4) keep the same level of output but reduce the 
standard. Both CAF commanders and the Weapons School cadre agree that 
lowering the standard is not an option. Nor is decreasing the output. And 
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instructors already work at maximum effort. That leaves as the only solution an 
increase of resources—or else a stall of the standard is unavoidable. An 
increased supply of resources, of course, is currently being employed in reverse. 
This presents us with a veritable Catch-22: we need stability in order to 
objectively measure changes to the standard over time, yet without being able to 
objectively demonstrate that the standard may be slipping we can’t guarantee 
ourselves the resources necessary to ensure stability. In order to “stop the 
madness,” the Weapons School must first raise the concern of detrimental 
effects—the induced drag—caused by disruptions and distractions to the 
syllabus. A system is presented in this thesis for how to measure the effects of 
such things as airshows, short notice airspace/munitions/aircraft changes, and 
personnel distractions. Data to be gathered from student waivers and a 
commitment to precise and unhindered grading standards will allow the school to 
pave the way toward objective measurement. With clarity on the performance of 
its syllabi, the school should then be able to make a convincing case to reverse 
the decline in resources and secure the standard of its graduates and, more 
importantly, the CAF. 
If the school fails to recognize and communicate its predicament the 
danger is profound. The Weapons School is charged with developing a weapons 
officer who is responsible for training his/her unit and who dutifully passes on the 
learned training concepts and values. Since the school is potentially unaware of 
its paradox, each graduate carries forth not only a less than desired standard of 
training, but also the damaging idea that doing too much with too little is 
acceptable. Unfortunately, the CAF has allowed resources to shape its training 
concepts and thus its combat readiness, instead of the reverse. Correcting our 
course on this slippery slope is a matter of committing to the overall objective—
air and space dominance—by shaping the appropriate ends, ways, and means. 
My argument is that resource deficiencies at the Weapons School result in 
deceptive and corrosive effects that could cost our Air Force its preeminence. If 
the primary advantage over our next opponent is the way in which we train, then 
 xvii
the CAF should easily understand the dangers inherent in compromising training 
at the Weapons School. To voice the sentiments of the cadre and presumably all 
members of the CAF: if our aim is to enter battle and dominate our enemies, then 
















I. INTRODUCTION AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
You never get good enough…a complacent pilot gets killed.  
LtCol Robbie Risner 
Walking into the United States Air Force Weapons School, you are 
greeted by a floor mat emblazoned with the words The CAF’s Center of 
Excellence—no small statement for any organization, but one that is well 
deserved and defended. It is, in fact, a label that has been bestowed upon the 
Weapons School by the Combat Air Force (CAF) itself. 
The product of a century of aviation, Nellis Air Force Base is the center of 
airpower. All that has been collected in the art and science of air combat, all that 
is theorized and proven in modern combat aviation, everything the United States 
Air Force is designed to do, passes through this single nucleus. For thousands of 
frontline airmen in the CAF, Nellis is the Mecca of their culture. A pilgrimage here 
is an opportunity to see where it all happens—tactics development, the most 
advanced training in the world, and flying ranges that are unparalleled. While 
several major units operate at Nellis, arguably none is more pivotal than the 
USAF Weapons School. Here, America’s best fighter pilots, weapons systems 
officers, helicopter and bomber crews, intelligence officers, weapons directors, 
and space officers, are engaged in the tactical world’s most demanding training 
process—the creation of a Weapons Officer.  
This thesis intends to capture that process, validate its importance to the 
CAF, and assess whether the Weapons School’s and the CAF’s standard of 
excellence is at risk. By taking the cadre’s opinions seriously, this thesis ties to 
an analytical system designed to elicit hard data in order to compel the CAF to 
take action.  
 
A. THE CENTER OF THE UNIVERSE—NELLIS AFB 
In the words of the former USAF Chief of Staff, General John Jumper, “As 
goes Nellis, so goes the CAF.” This is true partly because Nellis is blessed with 
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everything an aerospace warrior could dream of—thousands of square miles of 
airspace, a staggering array of live weapons ranges, ideal flying weather, and an 
infrastructure designed to capitalize on collective learning. Of course, none of it is 
relevant without truly impressive people to synthesize these elements into tools 
of airpower. These people are selected from the best the USAF has to offer, and 
nearly all are graduates of the Weapons School.  
Of the operational organizations at Nellis, the Weapons School stands out 
as the conduit through which all others must pass—if not directly given the 
Weapons Instructor Course (WIC) prerequisite for assignment, then indirectly as 
a consequence of the Weapons School’s immense influence in devising the 
CAF’s training. Units at Nellis conduct a variety of leading edge missions, 
including operational testing, adversary replication, developing the CAF’s most 
important large force training exercise (Red Flag), and others. Not only does the 
Weapons School train the officers who man the majority of the billets in these 
units, but the school also supports and augments their activities through liaisons, 
coordination, and implementation of their work. In one form or another, the 
Weapons School is in the thick of everything the CAF does. 
The Weapons School’s primary mission “is to teach graduate-level 
instructor courses, which provide the world's most advanced training in weapons 
and tactics employment to officers of the combat air forces.”1 Taking the most 
highly qualified instructors in each combat platform, the Weapons School 
develops unparalleled expertise in that weapon system by teaching highly refined 
skills of instructorship, problem solving, and tactical mission integration.  These 
officers are drawn from the CAF at large, but possess distinguishing qualities that 
reflect the school and its history. They are chosen based on their ability to 
instruct in their weapon system, which implies a high standard of credibility, 
integrity, and affability. The product of the school is a weapons officer who is 
finely tuned in the skills of communication, integration of joint forces, large force 
 
1 Nellis Air Force Base, USAF Weapons School web page; available at 
http://www.nellis.af.mil/usafws/default.htm; Internet; accessed 19 Aug 2005. 
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mission planning, training plan development, and tactical leadership.2 The CAF 
relies on these graduates to head “weapons shops” in each unit that manage that 
unit’s tactical training and combat preparation. Additionally, the weapons officer 
is the chief instructor in that unit, responsible for the quality of training, guidance, 
and mentorship of unit instructors, and is a direct tactical advisor to the 
leadership. In war time, the weapons officer can be expected to lead the unit’s 
first combat mission after the commander or deputy, as well as oversee a 
mission planning cell, or otherwise perform functions that are pivotal to mission 
success. You will never find a weapons officer idly waiting for direction—instead, 
the weapons officer demonstrates leadership and initiative. The CAF relies 
heavily on its weapons officers to do expertly what others cannot. The weapons 
officer’s qualification, experience, and character contribute in ways that are 
indispensable to an air force that operates at a redline pace during peace and 
war. 
The Weapons School is divided into Weapons Squadrons (WPS) 
according to major weapon system. There are fourteen weapons squadrons 
executing eighteen syllabi spanning five fighter types, three bomber types, direct-
support intelligence, as well as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) experts, command and control, space operations, combat rescue, and 
special operations forces (fixed and rotary wing). While each of these squadrons 
has a different legacy and different missions in the CAF, they all work toward a 
common goal of instilling the school’s graduates with the skills, traits, and values 
expected of combat leaders. 
Given the responsibility of its graduates, the Weapons School is 
committed to providing the absolute best training opportunities possible. The 
standards for receiving “the patch” are realistically high—attrition naturally 
occurs, but to the credit of the Weapons School instructors, all graduates find 
themselves learning to overcome personal limitations to demonstrate their value 
to the school and the CAF. Through highly developed syllabi, they are given 
 
2 John R. Carter, “The Weapons School n a Post-9/11 World,” USAF Weapons Review, 
Summer 2004, 4. 
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problem solving skills and tactical proficiency that marks them as the best. Each 
WIC syllabus includes fundamental training in the weapon system, progressing to 
advanced levels of execution and missions, and finally culminating in the highest 
tier of airpower employment during platform integration and the Mission 
Employment phase (ME). Because the teaching method focuses on the student’s 
performance, elements such as hardware, software, and support assets are 
extremely important to provide superior functionality. An aircraft with a 
malfunctioning radar, for example, invalidates the student’s performance in 
significant ways. 
The USAF as a whole is undergoing significant transformation. Since 
2002, the F/A-22 has been introduced to operational testing and is now being 
fielded, several new and complex weapons have entered service, weapon 
systems are undergoing rapid upgrades in software, and the United States is 
engaged in global combat that stretches every resource to its limit. Because of its 
central role to the CAF’s progress, the Weapons School is responsible for setting 
the pace and thus feels every bit of strain on the system. From manpower 
shortages to aircraft repair, the Weapons School constantly suffers from resource 
deficits. Instructor manning and qualification continues to be an issue for nearly 
every commander. Additionally, the CAF itself is undermanned in certain 
weapons officer positions, requiring a higher output from the school. Nellis’ 
precious airspace and ranges are occupied almost twenty-four hours a day, with 
daylight usage at its absolute maximum. The aircraft that bring the syllabi to life 
are struggling to keep pace. Units providing adversary support (aircraft and 
surface systems) are predictably unpredictable since they also suffer from 
reduced resources. This all amounts to incredible stress on a machine designed 
to operate in a highly synchronized and standardized manner. Worse, while the 
Weapons School is experiencing higher stress, it is being supplied with less fuel.  
Not to be deterred, Weapons School instructors and commanders 
diligently streamline the process. They creatively “work around” problems, and 
share their solutions in order to maintain as sharp a cutting edge as possible. 
Without question, the problems posed, and even some of the solutions, 
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challenge the school’s ability to maintain its standard. With the strains only likely 
to increase in the future, at what point will doing too much with too little 
jeopardize—and no longer just challenge—the Weapons School’s standard of 
excellence? 
This is a difficult question to answer, as the tools for measuring the stress 
and its effects on the graduates are skewed by inconsistent execution of the 
syllabi. Each Weapons Squadron deliberately compares the expected 
performance of its syllabus with the actual performance. Statistics regarding such 
things as mission attrition rate, unaccomplished tasks, non-delivered mission 
requirements (weapons, airplanes), skill proficiency level, and the ever-important 
instructor’s “gut feel” should be components of the measurement system. 
Evaluation should point to deficiencies as well as excesses. Unfortunately, with 
the current state of fluctuating resource support, the syllabi and their subset 
phases are so heavily modified that comparing the standard from class to class is 
far from the objective measurement that is desired. As will be discussed, the 
consistent repetition of successful performance is key to generating the data with 
which to assess the standard.    
 
B. THESIS 
The Weapons School is often accused of having set “the bar” too high—
too high for normal students to reach, too high for an institution that serves a 
large air force, maybe even too high for the school itself. Unquestionably, those 
associated with the Weapons School take pride in the fact that they either 
reached the same high standard themselves or are contributing to the school’s 
cutting edge. The Weapons School’s leadership is constantly assessing the 
extent to which it is “in touch with reality” by soliciting feedback from the CAF. 
This feedback plays an important role in reevaluating the standard. The 
Weapons School also sees itself playing a critical role in the development of the 
CAF—it is the keeper of an attitude that continues to define the air force which it 
serves. The questions to be answered here are: 
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1. What Exactly Makes Up the Standards of the Weapons 
School? 
The question of standards is complex. First, envision the Weapons 
School’s grand objective—producing a weapons officer—specified by a standard. 
Then consider the sub-objectives used to form the overall product, each with its 
own individual standards. The development of standards is an iterative process 
that combines yesterday’s lessons, today’s demands, and expectations about 
tomorrow. Additionally, standards cannot be evaluated by as objective a measure 
as a written exam. Most skills are learned in an audition of sorts, where the 
student and instructor are both participants in a very long and complex 
performance. The performance is often measured against the performance of 
previous classes and with a degree of subjectivity made slightly differently by 
each instructor. One aim of this thesis is to extract and analyze the standards 
used in order to gauge their importance to the Weapons School. 
2. Are these Components Truly Under Siege? 
Emotions run high when intense effort is expended to achieve such 
ambitious goals. The focus here is to tie the emotions of the workforce to the 
product of the school. Do emotions indicate something significant? Is the school 
able to objectively evaluate its performance? 
3. What are the Consequences if the “Center Of Excellence” 
Changes Its Attitude? 
While assessing the health of the Weapons School, this thesis also 
considers its future options: should it continue on the current course and hope 
the standard is maintained? Should it accept a lower standard and its 
consequences? Or, take a methodical approach to improving all the components 
of the system and firmly control the standard of training? Given a shift in 
standards, intentional or not, there are undoubtedly consequences for the CAF.  
4. What Measurements Can Provide Evidence of Slippage? 
A necessary tool for the decision-maker is a feedback system that can 
provide actionable evidence. A scheme for objective data collection will be 
presented based on the suggested findings of my research. 
 
 C. FRAMEWORK 
The WIC syllabus offers a useful framework for answering these 
questions. As pointed out by the Weapons School Commandant (from 2003-
2005), Colonel John Carter, the graduate reflects the syllabus, and that syllabus 
is a strategy.3 A simple way to view strategy is as a product of “Ends (objectives 
toward which one strives) plus Ways (courses of action) plus Means 



















 WAYS  
 
Figure 1. WIC SYLLABUS STRATEGY.  (Adapted from Lykke) 
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3 John R. Carter, Personal Interview, 17 May 2005. 
4 Arthur F. Lykke Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in Col Arthur F. Lykke 
Jr., editor, Military Strategy: Theory and Application (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War 
College, 1989), 3.  
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Essentially, the Weapons School devises ways to employ means to 
achieve ends. Applying such a strategy requires identifying what role the 
weapons officer is expected to fulfill (or identifying what effects are desired). This 
determines how the graduate would look in terms of skills, traits, and values. 
Understanding the vehicle for achieving the effects, the Weapons School devises 
a strategy to incorporate the three components. Sub-objectives are designed to 
give the weapons officer specific capabilities. Desired resources are weighed 
against available resources then integrated with desired and available concepts. 
All three legs of the syllabus must be worked and re-worked to achieve balance, 
else a shortfall leads to failure.  
In each weapons squadron, there exists a continual process of evaluating 
the mechanics of this strategy: a review of expected versus actual performance, 
a critique of the methods, and a summary of the impact of resources is done to 
some extent. In the spirit of the school’s mantra of self-reflection, this review 
serves to improve follow-on iterations of the syllabus.  
An important dimension of this review process is how these components 
are shaped and constructed. Never will you find the conclusion, “that’s good 
enough” or “we’ll fix it next time.” Encoded in the DNA of Weapons School 
instructors is the unwavering expectation of perfection. If there is time available 
and the means to improve something, then improvement will occur. The personal 
commitment displayed by these professionals is truly staggering. The 
fundaments of the entire United States Air Force rest on this attitude of “no 
problem too great” with the aptitude to back it up. 
 
D. RESEARCH METHOD 
This thesis draws from three sources of information: interviews and 
questionnaires of Weapons School personnel and CAF squadron commanders, 
review of open source historical references, and the author’s experience as a 
Weapons School instructor. 
 
 9 
1. Interviews and Questionnaires 
The information for this study was collected by permission of the Weapons 
School Commandant, Colonel John Carter (head of the Weapons School from 
April 2003 until July 2005). Information was solicited from members of the 
Weapons School at the levels of instructor and squadron commander. While the 
squadrons operate from discrete syllabi, they are sufficiently uniform in their 
methods and goals to allow generalities to be drawn about the Weapons School 
from the data. Questionnaires were made available to the entire population of 
fourteen squadron commanders and approximately 200 instructors. Thirty 
responses were received. Six interviews were conducted selectively. 
CAF squadron commanders were likewise solicited, though not all Air 
Force squadron commanders were contacted. Six responded directly out of forty 
contacted, and there were no interviews. 
2. Open Source and Organizational References 
All information gained from open sources is annotated with standard 
citations throughout the text and referenced in the bibliography. 
3. Personal Experience 
This study reflects insider and outsider observation methods. The 
interviews and questionnaires were designed to elicit responses objectively, and 
were conducted after I left the Weapons School. The insider perspective comes 
from my two years and nine months spent as an instructor in the 16th WPS, from 
January 2002 through September 2004 in the F-16 squadron. I have first hand 
experience of every issue discussed in this study, and it is from this perspective, 
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II. FROM WWII TO MODERN AIR COMBAT:  HOW THE 
WEAPONS SCHOOL ARRIVED AT EXCELLENCE 
The man who enters combat encased in solid armor plate, but 
lacking the essential of self-confidence, is far more exposed and 
naked to death than the individual who subjects himself to battle 
shorn of any protection but his own skill, his own belief in himself 
and in his wingman. Righteousness is necessary for one's peace of 
mind, perhaps, but it is a poor substitute for agility . . . and a 
resolution to meet the enemy under any conditions and against any 
odds. 
Major Robert S. Johnson, USAAF 
It is incredible to witness world-class organizations attract the best of their 
profession and then endure seemingly insurmountable hardships. Likewise, it is 
incredible to consider that America’s military has persisted through centuries of 
uncertainty to arrive at absolute preeminence. The Air Force is the youngest of 
the services, but one of the most rapidly growing in capabilities, competencies, 
and dependability. Clearly, America’s global influence is heavily reliant on the 
logistical and combat presence offered by the Air Force. In the course of 100 
years, America’s airmen have defined the benchmark of airpower. In its highest 
form, airpower is epitomized in the Weapons School. The ascent to the top and 
staying on top in the future is the subject here. 
 
A. FROM GUNNERY TECHNIQUES TO THE INSTRUCTIONAL METHOD 
 
In the late 1940s a group of veteran combat pilots were assembled 
in the Nevada desert to pass on the lessons learned by themselves 
and fallen comrades to a new crop of fighter pilots. They called it: 
Gunnery Camp.5
World War Two contributed in incomparable ways to the shape of today’s 
military. In its battle against the formidable Axis air forces, the US Army Air Force 
(AAF) fielded no less than sixteen different combat aircraft in just four years. 
 
5 Rick Llinares and Chuck Lloyd, Warfighters: A History of the USAF Weapons School and 
the 57th Wing (Atgeln, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1996), 110. 
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Given all the complexity and uncertainty, how an institution could train 80,000 
aircrew members in the skills of air combat during wartime is nothing short of 
inspiring.6 The breadth of combat and training experiences provided a firm 
foundation for the leaner years to follow. 
In the years after WWII, the Army Air Force was awarded a seat at the 
adult table. Granted its own service separate from the Army, the US Air Force 
(USAF) became clearly responsible for the realm of combat above the earth. This 
meant it had to harness the experiences of thousands of aircrew members into 
lessons that would contribute to the jet age. With the re-absorption of these 
aircrew into the civilian world, many opportunities were bound to be lost. So, as 
any smart institution would do, the Air Force gathered its combat veterans to 
devise ways of passing on their lessons. In 1949, the USAF opened Las Vegas 
Air Base and established the USAF Aircraft Gunnery School. Complete with F-
80s, WWII veterans passed on the skills and techniques learned over Europe, 
Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. During the next year, F-86s were incorporated and 
the second annual USAF Gunnery Meet revealed serious deficiencies in air-to-
ground weapons employment. The Gunnery School began formalizing methods 
of instruction and published its own Fighter Gunnery newsletter (a predecessor to 
the Weapons Review of today).7 Here, instructors were able to disseminate 
lessons taught and learned at the school directly to the field. A profession 
challenged with high turnover and rapid evolution of its equipment, the Air Force 
found itself forced to learn and teach quickly lest the next war catch it 
unprepared. 
During the Korean War, the Gunnery School shifted focus and became a 
much needed supplement to combat aircrew training. Gunnery instruction was 
set aside to ensure crews bound for Korea were prepared with basic airmanship. 
The school was working with three types of aircraft (F-51s, F-80s, and F-86s) 
 
6 “Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World War II,” The United States Army Air Forces in 
World War II, on-line database; available at http://www.usaaf.net/digest/t52.htm; Internet; 
accessed 20 Aug 2005. 
7 Marty Isham, “Chronology of the USAF Weapons School, 1949 to Present,” USAF 
Weapons Review, Spring/Summer 1999. 38. 
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and was charged with graduating 760 pilots a year—not what the Gunnery 
School had in mind. As such, it was eager to resume its development of fighter 
tactics. Renamed Nellis AFB, the post-Korean War Aircraft Gunnery School was 
flying four variants of the F-86, executing both air-to-air and air-to-ground 
missions. Additionally, the first F-100As were rolling off the assembly line, further 
challenging the Air Force’s ability to keep aircrew on pace with weapon system 
advancement. Having already consolidated highly experienced combat veterans 
at the Gunnery School, the Air Force realized the utility of developing tactics 
across multiple airframes. It was the efficiency and effectiveness of this 
“schoolhouse” construct that evolved into the Fighter Weapons School. The 
Fighter Weapons School, as it would be called for the next 40 years, “was further 
tasked to develop training methods and techniques on all related equipment and 
training methods focused on solving training problems in tactical units.”8  
A great problem for the Fighter Weapons School was its lack of control 
over resources. Fighter aircraft were continually shuffled between bases and 
commands in the 1950s, a time when the Fighter Weapons School belonged to 
the Air Training Command (ATC). The result was that this core training unit was 
often left with resource deficiencies and no control over the basis of its 
existence—the jet fighter. With Tactical Air Command (TAC) being the primary 
customer of the Fighter Weapons School’s graduates, a competition of interests 
ensued, and the school was caught in the middle. Stuck with whatever ATC was 
willing to give it, the school had no choice but to modify its program to fit the 
resources. In July 1958, the Air Force solved the problem by transferring the 
Fighter Weapons School to TAC, thus aligning input with output and allowing 
TAC to control the quality of its school graduates.9 This is an important moment 
in Weapons School history: it gave the combatant command control over its 
future, which it retains to this day. 
The 1960s saw the F-105 and F-4 added to the F-100 WIC, with the F-111 
in operational testing. More importantly, the changing of the guard was nearly 
 
8 Llinares,110. 
9 Ibid., 32. 
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complete as WWII veterans retired, leaving their protégés with unequivocal 
responsibility for the future of the fighter force. By now, tactics and procedures 
had been formalized and new ground was being broken on subjects such as 
element visual maneuvering, air-to-air missiles, Energy Maneuverability Theory, 
and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses. 
Vietnam marked a relative low point for the Air Force. As the conflict spun 
up, the Air Force again needed to train new pilots. In a controversial move, pilots 
of transport and tanker aircraft were converted to fighters. During the late 1960s, 
fighter pilots and their weapon system officers (WSOs) became a mishmash of 
aggressive fighter jocks and newbie aircrews just trying to hang on. The 
difference in skills and aviation cultures introduced enough challenges that 
aircrew members required indoctrination in less complicated jets before entering 
Replacement Training Units (RTU).10 In addition to learning airmanship at 
supersonic speeds, those converting to fighters needed to understand the fighter 
mind-set— “The attitude instilled by RTU instructors into their students was of the 
‘sierra hotel’ mentality—aggressiveness. Particularly for the lieutenants, it 
translated into ‘the fighter pilot desire to excel no matter the odds.’”11
Under intense pressure to produce aircrews, RTUs focused less on 
dynamic air-to-air training. Risk aversion was cited as a reason to minimize 
dogfighting. This shift arguably contributed heavily to the lackluster Air Force kill 
ratios of Vietnam.12 Despite this, Fighter Weapons School graduates continued 
to dominate air-to-air performance in the war, due as much to their skill as to their 
role as flight leaders in combat.13 This disparity between Fighter Weapons 
School graduates and mainstream aircrew led to criticism of air-to-air training. 
During the nine months of Linebacker I and II, the Air Force had a 2:1 kill ratio 
compared to the Navy’s 6:1. Many factors contributed to the difference, but the 
 
10 Llinares, 17-18. 
11 C.R. Andregg, Sierra Hotel: Flying Air Force Fighters in the Decade after Vietnam 
(Washington D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2001), 26 
12 Ibid., 20. 
13 Marshall L. Michael III, Clashes: Air Combat Over North Vietnam (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 1997), 282. 
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one most cited was the advantages that accrued from the Navy’s Topgun 
program, ironically enough, a spin off of the Fighter Weapons School.14 Topgun 
was created specifically to fix the Navy’s own kill ratio decline in the early stages 
of Vietnam. 
In the years following Vietnam, Air Force leaders pointed the finger at TAC 
and the Fighter Weapons School, and rightfully so. The school was responsible, 
after all, for developing formations and tactics, and its graduates performed well 
in combat. The question was, why didn’t the rest of the Air Force crews, and why 
was the Navy outclassing the Air Force? Weapons and airplanes were part of the 
issue, but technology was quickly improving in the form of new radar guided air-
to-air missiles. Additionally, two new fighters were on the books—the F-15C and 
the Lightweight Fighter (the future F-16). The disjuncture really lay in training. 
The Fighter Weapons School recognized its shortcomings in this area and 
learned a valuable lesson—fighter pilots who were “great sticks” were nothing if 
their skills were not transferable to the common air force. The mid-1970s thus 
saw the birth of the Aggressors and Red Flag.15 Red Flag’s attention to realistic 
training provided the energy to create the Air Force’s greatest training asset—the 
Nellis range complex—and the discrete skills learned in dissimilar air-to-air 
training are still considered to be of great value today. 
Post-Vietnam, the value of focused experiential training and a commitment 
to passing on lessons—both fundaments of the instructional method—definitely 
took hold, though not without some turbulence along the way. 
 
14 Michael, 277-8. 
15 The Aggressor program was developed in response to the need for realistic air-to-air 
training. The 64th FWS was initially activated as part of the FWS in 1972. Resources expanded 
allowing the addition of three more aggressor squadrons, including one for each of the Pacific 
and European theaters. In 1989, the aggressor program was reduced to a single squadron (64th 
FWS) stationed at Nellis AFB. Interestingly, the AF is again expanding its aggressor program in 
2006. (Red Flag: 414th CTS; available from http:// www.nellis.af.mil/red_flag/; Internet; accessed 7 
Oct 2005). 
Red Flag was also created in the early 1970s to provide realistic combat training for aircrews. 
The program has evolved a model for large force training that integrates all elements of air power, 
including allied forces. Red Flag is hosted at Nellis AFB and shares substantial resources with 
other local units. 
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The Cold War era Fighter Weapons School was characterized by cocky 
combat veterans loyal to one thing—each other. “The fighter pilot culture that 
emerged from the smoke, dust, and blood of Vietnam was multifaceted. The 
three things that mattered most in fighter squadrons were flying skills, flight 
discipline, and unit cohesion.”16 While these qualities were not bad in 
themselves, the egotistical attitude of the fighter culture was nothing short of 
unpleasant. This proved a problem for an institution charged with fixing the 
problems of Vietnam. Maybe as its own way of instilling its dogma throughout the 
Tactical Air Force (TAF), the instructors ensured the highest standard of training, 
such that “every ride seemed like a check ride.”17 Even with such a productive 
training ideal, the instructors were perceived as overbearing, probably because 
of their superior knowledge and skill. For students with no combat experience, 
but still with a responsibility for receiving the torch, a contradiction was born. 
A turning point occurred in 1974 when Major Larry Keith, a non-Fighter 
Weapons School graduate, was assigned as operations officer of the F-4 WIC. In 
an about-face, Keith changed the way Fighter Weapons School instructors 
approached teaching. In short, instructors were not to be drill sergeants, but 
teachers. High standards yes, but combat skills must be taught as effectively as 
they were to be learned. 
 
B. BUILDING BLOCKS TO THE MODERN COMBAT AIR FORCE 
That turning point led the Fighter Weapons School and the TAF to a new 
way to approach training. The Winter 1976 and Spring 1977 issues of the Fighter 
Weapons Review “outlined a training method and continuum for teaching fighter 
crews everything from basic aircraft handling to the most complex tactics. The 
heart of the training system was the ‘building block approach’ (BBA)…The BBA 
began with the idea that the final objective must drive every aspect of the training 
program…Each of these missions was a building block upon which more difficult 
objectives rested…By the time a student arrived at a complex level, he would 
 
16 Andregg, 45. 
17 Ibid., 51. 
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have individually experienced each facet of the complexity.”18 This method 
remains at the base of CAF training today. 
The value of the building block approach is that it resembles a strategy for 
achieving an end. It requires the assessment of objectives, and then lays the 
basis for ensuring the ends are met. In the post-WWII era, training was largely 
experiential trial and error; that is, students were immersed in scenarios that 
resembled combat, and skills were repeated until proficient. Experience, 
particularly in combat, is invaluable. Every bit of training conducted today is 
based on providing experience, whether it is general (“I’ve seen that before”) or 
specific (“I’ve learned some things from that experience”). However, given the 
incredibly broad spectrum of tasks, sensors, weapons, and airframes currently in  
use, it is prohibitive to use purely experiential trial and error instruction—where 
everything must be learned to an expert level of proficiency—for every airman. 
The building block approach, tuned to an effects-based variation, is the outcome 
of 50-plus years of learning about teaching. 
With the building block approach, as specified by then Captain John 
Jumper (recently the Air Force Chief of Staff), proficiency at tiers below defined 
what could be accomplished in tiers above. The pinnacle in 1977 was to create 
an F-4 crew that could plan, brief, lead, and debrief a composite force mission.19 
This meant the crew had to be highly proficient in its own aircraft (since a mission 
commander also flew his own jet) as well as versed in every detail of the mission 
at hand. The enablers for this superhuman task done with expertise were the 
most basic flying skills. A crew that was not great at handling a fighter under 
austere circumstances would be of no use leading a package of 100 aircraft. 
Thus, the school and the syllabus placed a great emphasis on superb flying 
abilities.  
The building block approach and its timing was critical to the 1980s 
generation of fighters. The F-15C, F-16, and A-10 led to divisions of their own at 
 
18 Andregg, 54. 
19 Ibid., 54. 
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Fighter Weapons School during this time. Because the Air Force used 
experienced pilots from existing platforms to field its new jets, Fighter Weapons 
School graduates were able to pass on the BBA to the newcomers. With a new 
generation of aircraft committed to a single role (e.g., F-15C for air superiority, A-
10 for close air support), the result was a revealing pursuit of ideals. Air-to-air 
fighting has always been labeled the purest form of air combat for its valiant 
pitting of man versus man. In a fighter designed specifically for this purpose, the 
F-15C community has taken this concept to a new level. Similarly, no other 
fighter in the world can match an A-10’s voracity on enemy ground forces. These 
elite capabilities have been derived from combat experience, superior training, an 
attitude of dominance, and a taste of supremacy.  
The syllabi used for instruction today are firmly based on the building 
block approach. There is a more detailed method of instruction, however, that 
has contributed to the Weapons School and CAF’s arrival at such lofty levels of 
execution. 
As alluded to, all learning is based on experience. Given no effort to 
analyze experiences, we would learn only to the point of recognizing a past 
occurrence and modify our future actions to model it. The basic idea of 
experiential training is to put students in numerous situations without regard to 
their actual performance. Experiential training (often referred to as “fam training”) 
has no standard attached.  The benefit is exposure to a wide variety of scenarios 
in the hope that the student will apply some of what s/he learned to future 
circumstances. At the modern Weapons School, such training occurs at the top 
of the building block pyramid where all the skills are applied to the most realistic 
and challenging missions conceivable. While this would not be the Weapons 
School’s first choice, the school surely values the benefit to be gained via pure 
experience, particularly in very complex or unique scenarios that cannot be 
duplicated on a regular basis. 
A step up from the pure experiential method is the concept of trial and 
error. Now teaching to a standard of execution, trial and error requires repeating 
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scenarios until the student sees it enough times to apply its recall. Given the 
highly dynamic nature of air combat and the inability to control the innumerable 
variables, even trial and error is unrealistic, yet it is used particularly in basic skill 
development.  
These experiential training techniques were used by the F-4 WIC even in 
the 1970s, when these “graduation rides” were reputed to be “the most 
challenging they ever flew outside of actual combat.”  
GAT 5/6 was the culmination of the building block approach. Each 
block had measurable objectives, but the final objective was 
measured as well. Such obsession with combat capability was not 
prevalent in most fighter units, but the students of the Weapons 
School saw how important it was, and they took what they learned 
back to their home units. There, they pressed their commanders for 
more realism in training and stricter accounting of success and 
failure, so that their home units could improve despite continuing 
reductions in flying hours and decreasing combat experience.20
Through the efforts of men like Maj. Keith and those who followed, this 
building block approach has yielded a method whereby individuals draw the 
salient learning points from any situation. Given any experience, the weapons 
officer is expected to accurately reconstruct what actually happened, assess 
his/her performance measured against the mission objectives, and draw timeless 
lessons for better performance. Any time the student sets a plan and acts on the 
plan, this routine is applied. The result is a convergence on perfection. As such, 
the Weapons School today is sharpening the building block concept with the 
notion of effects-based training (similar to the operational concept of “effects 
based operations”). In the spirit of the building block approach where the “final 
objective must drive every aspect of the training program,”21 the Weapons 
School is in the process of streamlining those objectives and their supporting 
building blocks.  
 
20 Andregg, 59. 
21 Ibid., 51. 
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The instructional method, the building block approach, and an addiction to 
superlative performance have formed some unique characteristics in the cadre at 
the Weapons School and in the CAF as a whole. 
 
C. CREATION OF INSTITUTIONAL VALUES 
In the course of developing tactical training, the Weapons School strives 
to instill more than excellent skills. The infinitely greater trait of the Weapons 
School is its ability to pass on those skills and even improve upon them with 
every iteration. Consider how any society (in this case, the CAF) passes on the 
things it values. Since our behavior today is learned from what happened 
yesterday, it goes without saying that we develop skills from the trial and error of 
our experiences. As the worth of those skills is proved in related tasks, we then 
characterize them as traits. In flying terms, decision-making skill might be a 
subset of the trait of having high situational awareness (SA). Those with high SA 
tend to make good decisions regardless of the scenario. Similarly, a fighter pilot 
is said to have “good hands” if s/he handles the jet well in any situation. Superior 
skill in basic fighter maneuvers or performing a visual bomb delivery is said to be 
a consequence of “good hands.” 
Traits are surpassed by concepts. This may seem a big jump, but consider 
how traits are valued. In the flying community, traits are passed on through 
training concepts—how to train a person to build and utilize SA, or how to take 
someone with not such good hands and develop the skills to do what those with 
good hands do. The building block approach and the instructional method 
represent ideas and concepts designed to hone traits. Ideally, if we have a good 
concept, we can then learn or teach any of its subsets. 
The leap from training concepts is to values. Values pervade everything 
we do. Because our history of combat-tried skills has come at the expense of 
blood, we tend to not just value, but demand excellence in all we do. While every 
organization likes to placard this saying in the work place, the Weapons School 
means it, as evidenced by its reputation. Of course, this is not a one-way street. 
 There are all sorts of feedback effects. Values are clearly connected to our most 
basic functions. Our concepts are shaped by values, traits are selected based on 
concepts (and values), abilities are shaped by traits (and values and concepts), 
and our actions are ultimately a reflection of all of the above. Meanwhile, once 
the value of excellence has been encoded in the institution, it drives absolutely 
everything there. Moreover, this is the biggest contribution the Weapons School 
makes to the CAF—the value system is the CAF’s “operational conscience.” The 
Weapons School passes its values on through its graduates, and because 
of this, the US Air Force is the most dominant force on—and above—the 
planet.  





















































III. CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS IN THE USAF       
WEAPONS SCHOOL 
Your task [is] the guardian of the unit’s operational conscience, its 
role model, teaching weapons excellence and leading weapons 
employment, assisting the commander to ensure the unit can 
perform its weapons delivery mission, any time, any place. 
General Michael P. Carns, former USAF Vice Chief of Staff, 
57WG Commander, and Weapons School Commandant 
 
A. TANGIBLE TRAITS AND INTANGIBLE VALUES 
In Chapter II, I delineated among actions, skills, traits, concepts, and 
values. The interesting thing about each of these echelons is what they 
contribute to an individual or organization’s performance. At the most 
fundamental level, we are concerned about the effect of an action. No matter 
how good the performance, if the effect is undesirable, then the action (and 
overriding skill, etc.) must be reconsidered. In addition, if the action is repeatedly 
performed poorly then the skills are questionable. While actions are clearly 
measurable, skills are slightly less so, and traits, concepts, and values even less. 
How does this fact impact an organization’s ability to assess its performance? 
How do we consider indicators that are not easily measurable? 
First, as mentioned, a lot of emphasis is placed on the effects of one’s 
actions.  In order to produce an effect, a deliberate act must have been 
employed. In fact, if the desired effects are not achieved, then the action is 
viewed as a failure. The effect, or end, of our action is thus easy to account for 
and lends itself to easy measurement. Generally, actions are easily viewed and 
reproduced. This is why most schools teach abilities (skills) to produce actions. 
This is the most basic level of reproducing effects.  
 Measuring the skill of a person is slightly more difficult than measuring 
his/her actions. Arguably, since skill is integral to any consistent action, then skill 
can be measured by consistent actions. This, in fact, is how the Weapons School 
assesses a person’s skill level. Students are put into scenarios with desired 
effects. The individual’s actions are then compared with normative expectations 
and, over time, the individual’s skill level is measured. Because skills are not 
directly measurable, the experiment is repeated in order to determine the 
consistency with which the individual meets the standards set by the syllabus. 
This, in effect, eliminates the chance of a lucky performance. Figure 3 
enumerates the core skills the Weapons School desires in its weapons officers. 
Figure 3. WEAPONS OFFICER CORE SKILLS. 
Weapons Officer Core Skills 
 
1. Demonstrate the communications skills necessary to teach weapons and tactics as a unit’s chief 
instructor, specifically in: 
− Mission briefing/during-mission instruction/debriefing: expert level. 
− Platform instruction: expert level. 
− Written communication: proficient level. 
 
2. Demonstrate, at the expert level, the knowledge, cognitive skills, leadership ability, and officership traits 
required to be a commander’s primary tactical advisor and problem solver, as well as a mentor to others. 
 
3. Demonstrate an understanding of the primary operations, functions, and missions conducted by joint 
forces, specifically in the: 
− Weapons and tactics employed by other CAF/joint forces: familiar level. 
− Tactical integration necessary for composite force operations: proficient level. 
− Role and mission of the Air and Space Operations Center (AOC): familiar level. 
 
4.  Demonstrate, at the proficient level, the knowledge, organizational skills, and leadership abilities 
necessary to lead an organization’s weapons and tactics function. 
 
5. Demonstrate, at the proficient level, the ability to organize, plan, and execute composite-force mission 
planning as a mission planning cell chief or key member of a mission planning cell team. 
 
Definitions 
Expert: Exhibiting special skill or knowledge; performance indicates mastery of the subject. 
Proficient: Well-advanced in skill; performance indicates understanding of important details of the subject. 
Familiar: Well-acquainted with the material; performance indicates understanding of the major elements of 
the subject. 
 
(From John R. Carter, “The Weapons School in a Post-9/11 World,” USAF 




                                           
It should be noted that this list represents a synthesis drawn from all of the 
weapons squadrons. Each squadron is then responsible for developing its own 
platform-specific skills in order to fulfill its specific mission goals. Essentially, the 
Weapons School’s core skills form a parent list from which all WIC syllabi are 
derived.22 In other words, the school is set up so that each syllabus and its 
resident phases perform to a similar routine. In order to validate a syllabus’s 
ability to produce a weapons officer to the prescribed standard, it must 
demonstrate its effects consistently and over time. Anything less could be passed 
off as conditional, unpredictable, and unmeasureable. 
The further we move from effects and actions, the less and less 
measurable each echelon becomes. One might well counter, who cares if all we 
are really concerned about is effects? Just to bring the argument back into focus, 
our pursuit of ends can have some interesting results if the ways and means are 
not considered. In the history of the Weapons School, effects were produced 
early on with highly undeveloped methods. With no real consistency in the 
techniques of training, individual instructors were left to their own devices to pass 
on their knowledge. As the instructors learned that some skills were better than 
others and some traits contributed more effectively to those skills, and, in fact, 
some teaching methods were superior, a value system did begin to take shape. 
Had the Weapons School failed to learn from its experiences, then presumably it 
would still be entrenched in hard-nosed, effects-only learning. Presumably, such 
an institution would rest on its laurels instead of continually breaking new ground 
in tactics, teaching, and training. The fact is, for the Weapons School, learning 
very deliberately is a core value, and because of this, efforts are made to see 
and measure these less visible echelons. This standard of excellence is self-
sustaining, that is, if it is rewarded and encouraged. 
It is often said that a weapons officer must be approachable such that, as 
an instructor, s/he can be accessible to anyone who wishes to learn. This is not a 
skill or ability, but a trait. If someone is easy to talk to, even about contentious 
 
22 John R. Carter, “The Weapons School in a Post-9/11 World,” USAF Weapons Review, 
Summer 2004. 4. 
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issues, then s/he can be freely engaged on any level. Not only is this critical to 
effective instruction, but it is very contagious. The more modest, amicable, and 
credible an expert is, the more willing people will be to partake of his/her 
expertise. It is no coincidence that the pronounced desired traits of a weapons 




The first two are generally integral to one’s personality, but slightly modifiable. 
Credibility, however, is where the Weapons School invests the majority of its 
effort. For an instructor to influence his/her squadron, a level of expertise is 
expected that surpasses that of others in the unit.  
 
B. CORE VALUES  
During my tour as an instructor and given my relationships with existing 
cadre, there was and is a distinct sense that that things are not as they should 
be. A driving question for this thesis is: is this merely a consequence of the 
infallible standard or is it a consequence of actual slippage? Among the 
instructors who execute the syllabi (planning and instructing missions), the 
predominant feeling is one of frustration. We always wished we could execute 
our Air Combat Command (ACC) approved syllabus as it was intended, never 
mind reaching above and beyond. Yet, it seemed a relentless battle to execute 
just one mission as it was forecast. This resulted in a constant shuffling of 
resources, modifying of profiles, compromising of learning objectives, and even 
writing off some experiences altogether. The collective perception, up through at 
least September of 2004, was that the Weapons School was insidiously sliding 
from excellence to mediocrity, and the very impassioned reaction to this by 
instructors was, I now believe, the best indicator of an attack on something very 
 
23 “Humble, approachable, credible” is a catchphrase used in the Weapons School to identify 
the most highly valued traits of a weapons officer.   
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difficult to measure—the Weapons School’s value system. My intent in 
interviewing and surveying the cadre of the Weapons School was to drive to the 
bottom of these emotional issues. The questions asked of the participants were 
thus intended to gauge whether my suspicions were correct. 
 Before looking at the Weapons School’s performance, it is necessary to 
consider the qualities it values. These values are implicitly reflected in the 
skills/traits/concepts conveyed. In the interviews and questionnaires, respondees 
considered the following qualities to be most important. 
Valued Qualities: 
1. Credible tactical expert and leader 
2. Humble and approachable teacher 
3. Comprehensive and authoritative knowledge 
4. Exemplary leader and decision maker 
5. Trained problem-solver 
6. Keeper of the tactical standards 
7. Warrior attitude 
8. Innovative thinker 
The attributes described here point to enviable professional qualities. Certainly, if 
something is worth doing, it is worth doing right. And since leadership is inherent 
to military roles, it’s worth doing this as well as possible. The Weapons School 
doesn’t just lead the CAF, but its graduates are designated leaders in CAF units. 
Leadership pervades everything the Weapons School values. In a phrase, the 
Weapons School believes in resolute leadership in everything it does. 
The self-described qualities of humility, approachability, and credibility 
support this statement. Credibility can be easily viewed as the cornerstone of the 
weapons officer’s leadership. As one commander commented, none of the 
weapons officer’s roles is possible without his/her being an undisputed expert in 
his/her weapon system. All of the skills required to teach a new operator, run a 
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unit’s training program, integrate joint forces, lead a combat mission, etc., must 
be performed at the highest level. If not, then the weapons officer loses his/her 
centrality as a leader and quickly loses effectiveness. When the same question 
was asked of the CAF commanders—the end-users of the weapons officer—they 
all highlighted credibility: the weapons officer “provides a PhD in fighter tactics,” 
“maintains high tactical standards,” is an “example of [the] highest standards of 
performance.”  
Clearly, the Weapons School is aligned with its customers in terms of the 
importance of credibility. The school’s reputation, created over decades of trial, 
has led to the Weapons School being the most influential entity in the CAF. Also 
at the top of the list is the importance placed on the people who make it all 
happen. It is important to the school and to the CAF that the cadre remains the 
vehicle for connecting the past to the present to the future. Without the cadre, the 
school has no basis for credibility and no hope of approachability. With them, it 
stands to change its world.  
Approachability, when combined with credibility, is one of those 
characteristics that grants an instant aura of leadership to those experts who 
possess it. Compared to someone who is egotistical or closed-minded, the 
approachable leader instills confidence and followership. This trait was 
exemplified in 1974 when Maj. Larry Keith snapped the F-4 WIC out of its 
swaggering trance and demanded affability from his instructors. 
Humility seems to be extremely difficult to find in those who are experts at 
their craft. The Weapons School tends to recruit this trait instead of create it, but 
without question, it can be taught. A student’s experience at the Weapons School 
is, after all, a humbling experience. One student commented, “I didn’t realize how 
much I didn’t know until I went through the Weapons School.” For those who 
embrace the mantra of self-improvement, this remains true despite ever 
improving abilities. As important as is an unassuming attitude is the sincere 
mutual respect for others. This is typically developed through earnest self-
reflection and an intimate knowledge of others’ capabilities and intentions. The 
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more a student learns to trust his/her peers, the more a sense of mutual respect 
is fostered which dampens arrogance. 
 
C. RESOLUTENESS OF THE SYLLABUS 
In a system where specific training events are carefully crafted and 
uncompromisingly tested, the outcome of those events should reflect the 
Weapons School’s performance. As described, the most effective form of 
measurement is at the effects/action level of performance. These snapshots offer 
an incredibly useful perspective and, taken together, should contribute to valid 
assessment. The further we move from objective measurement, however, the 
more difficult it becomes to accurately describe the performance. Such is the 
case when arriving at issues involving values, where dissatisfaction is invariably 
expressed in emotional terms rather than via metrics. Why not measure effects, 
then, and consider the rest of the value system intact? In these days of 
turbulence, the syllabi have been disrupted such that the consistent 
measurement of effects and skills are highly questionable. 
To illustrate what I mean, consider an example. In any number of training 
sorties conducted in the F-16, one or more aircraft would suffer from a radar 
warning receiver (RWR) malfunction or failure. This was a symptomatic problem 
of aircraft maintenance at Nellis AFB. Since most training sorties were conducted 
against enemy forces employing radar-guided weapons (surface-to-air missiles 
or fighters), this often resulted in a dilemma for the instructor evaluating the 
mission. If the student was “killed” during the mission (because he was unaware 
of being targeted), he would be removed from the scenario for a period of time, in 
some cases permanently. This of course, prevented any consistent assessment 
of the student’s skills and, depending on the training objective, might result in a 
failed or “maintenance non-effective” sortie. After suffering from repeated issues 
like this (and there were many), the student would have to play catch up with the 
syllabus. There was limited room for repeating missions, and each successive 
scenario built on the demonstrated skills of the sortie before. The result has been 
groups of students who, through no fault of their own, have found themselves 
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under pressure to make up for performance lost, possibly distracting from the 
task at hand. Likewise, to cope with this has required instructors to creatively 
adjust the syllabus missions to ensure satisfactory completion of tasks that 
weren’t previously evaluated. What this means is that in no time the syllabus 
winds up altered so much that it can no longer serve as a standard method of 
feedback.  
Another example of the importance of accurate and consistent 
performance is how we validate tactics. Tactics development is based on the 
expectations of our enemy and how we might exploit their behavior through 
deliberate actions. After developing the actions and decisions to be employed, 
we test the tactic against a simulated adversary who behaves in accordance with 
our assumptions. If we call the “fight’s on” and the training adversary ignores all 
of our instructions, then our tactics experiment is likely to be marked “fun, but 
inconclusive.” Surely, there are things to learn every time we conduct training, 
but in terms of formalizing tactics, only consistent success in realistic 
scenarios validates our plan. Syllabus validation is no different, other than it is 
far more complex and, in many ways, more important. 
In any strategy that relies on equal contributions of ends, ways, and 
means, there must be constant adjustment and readjustment of all components. 
By definition, the ends cannot be achieved without adequate ways, and if the 
means are reduced, then the ends must follow suit. A shortening of one leg of the 
strategy stool results in it tipping over. This is the reason why, given the extreme 
complexity of measuring individual effects/actions/skills across eighteen syllabi, 
this study has focused on assessing the strategic components of just the 
weapons officer. 
1. Resources 
When presented with this same strategy framework and asked which 
element was the limiting factor, in every case but one the Weapons School 
commanders and instructors answered “resources.” In fact, in many cases 
resources—airplanes and personnel—was considered the most significant issue 
affecting their squadrons. In addition to what we traditionally think of as 
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resources, respondees and interviewees also cited time available to execute the 
syllabus, airspace, weapons, and their budget.  
More importantly is how these respondees felt this limiting factor of 
resources affects the quality of the graduates. In one instructor’s opinion, which 
summarizes many others, “When you stand down for a week in the middle of the 
Weapons Phase for an airshow, and waive rides due to [maintenance] factors, 
that graduate is a lesser product than someone that went through the whole 
syllabus. It's phased flying training with specific skills/experiences imparted 
during specific sorties. You miss one, you've missed something we, and the 
ACC/DO by extension, thought was important enough to put in the syllabus of the 
most comprehensive flying training the Air Force has.” 
Similarly, the resource issue has a very direct effect on the core traits of its 
graduates. “Without the proper resources, not only experience is impacted, but 
also basic (experiential) knowledge which affects credibility. Without all the 
resources necessary to instruct a WS grad, the fabric of the basic WS grad 
quickly begins to unravel, starting with experience.” Experience is the 
foundational method and means of instruction at the Weapons School. Without 
realistic, accurate, and purposeful scenarios, the whole course becomes an 
exercise in theory. 
The resource problem has all sorts of effects. For instance, as one 
Weapons School squadron commander summarizes:  
Lack of adequate training days means we squeeze 10 lbs into the 5 
lb bag. That means we rush things, don't take enough time to 
instruct to the exact level we need to, or we do go to the exact level 
we need to and it turns into a 75 hour week plus weekend duty for 
instructors and students. [It] doesn't create the best learning 
environment and students often just want to check off their 
objectives and move to the next one without fully digesting the 
[mission]. When their post-graduate assignment also demands this 
amount of time, it really puts a burden on weapons officers both 
before and after graduation.  
This drag effect tends to make desired objectives more difficult to obtain, which in 
turn requires more effort, which is why chasing objectives through a maze of 
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distractions and unanticipated obstacles is simply detrimental. Unfortunately, the 
tempo of Weapons School operations leaves little room for detours. 
2. Training Methods 
The approach taken under Col. Carter’s leadership was to validate every 
bit of training as to its contribution to the desired skills. If the cadre determined 
that an event had a negligible or redundant contribution, then it was a candidate 
for removal from the syllabus. This was a crucial step—the complexity of weapon 
systems is increasing rapidly, and with capabilities being continuously added to 
the platforms, the syllabus and cadre struggled to accommodate the growing 
pyramid required by the building block approach. The challenge this creates for 
the school is a rapidly increasing “cost of production” agitated by shrinking 
resources.24 In an effort to focus on the ends, the syllabi are being scrutinized for 
efficiency and effectiveness. This is the notion of “effects based training,” similar 
to effects based operations. Even so, the ways are being heavily influenced by 
the means, as noted over and over by the cadre. 
The cadre were asked what type of training concept they use, and 
whether it is optimal. There were a variety of answers, and all respondees 
acknowledged that their individual syllabi were undergoing constant revision. 
Interestingly, one respondee noted that based on the availability of resources 
(aircraft) his/her training concept was not optimal. Because his/her squadron’s 
aircraft can’t meet mission requirements, it must borrow aircraft from other units 
(something that is done routinely among the units stationed at Nellis). This factor 
contributed enough instability that the standard of training fluctuated with the 
performance of the maintenance squadron and the availability of the jets. 
Graduate quality was thus at the mercy of aircraft maintainability in this case. 
If the training concept were truly optimized, then it should maximize the 
use of resources in support of the objectives. Availability of resources should not 
be the determining factor in and of itself. Instead, how best to create the desired 
attributes of a weapons officer should drive the training concepts. 
 
24 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma (Boston: Harvard Business School 
Press, 1997). Also, Carter (2004), 4. 
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One course of action taken by squadrons is to incorporate more 
integration into their syllabus (usually this has been done adhoc, but is 
increasingly planned). “Integration” is an employment concept by which multiple 
platforms organize to achieve an array of effects, much as in actual combat 
operations. While integration trains an important core skill, increasingly it is being 
used as a training concept to satisfy a resource problem. One instructor 
remarked, “The largest impact [of organizational change on our standards] is 
through the necessary use of sister squadrons to integrate training. The impact is 
loss of certain specific objectives until both syllabi can be matched to maximize 
training objectives for all. This lowers the training standard as we have less time 
to give another attempt at an engagement to ensure the instruction was 
received.”  
The fact that a lack of resources is moving the squadrons to more 
integration is being rationalized away by the thought “we should integrate more 
anyway.” However, without the fundamental skills being met prior to integration, 
and with the subsequent competition over training objectives, what occurs over 
time is an erosion of skills preceding integration skills. It is difficult to argue 
against the need for greater integration skills, but before continuing on this 
dangerous course, the following question should be answered: which serves the 
CAF better, a weapons officer with excellent platform skills who is capable of 
integrating, or an excellent integrator with more limited individual capabilities? 
Regardless, careful attention needs to be paid to how we get there and the 
extent to which this might be costing graduates in other areas. 
3. Objectives 
The final category to consider is the ends themselves. I have made the 
argument that the overall strategic objective is the graduate. As such, all 
individual objectives should support this. The question I posed was this: “Are the 
standards of your objectives too high, too low, or appropriate given the desired 
quality of the graduate?” In every case, Weapons School commanders felt their 
standards were not too high. Two responses, however, shed further light on the 
dilemma that the Weapons School faces. In one multi-disciplinary squadron, the 
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standard might actually be too low. This is due to the varied backgrounds of 
students and a wide range of expectations upon graduation. In the commander’s 
opinion, time (a resource) influences his/her objectives and renders them lower 
than desired. 
As to how objectives might change in response to the environment, one 
commander commented, “In the end, if our objectives don’t change to meet the 
shrinking budget, the quality of graduate may decline because they won’t be able 
to achieve what we now think they need to achieve.” Indeed, what the 
commander points to here is the crux of the problem as far as this thesis is 
concerned: a decline in any one component of strategy results in the decline of 
all others. Once the training method has been optimized, if the flow and quality of 
resources declines—for any reason—the Weapons School must either 
intentionally lower standards, or allow them to insidiously decay. 
 
D. FROM ACTIONS TO RESOLUTENESS 
This chapter has carried us from why the Weapons School exists to how 
we have developed a clearly identified set of skills, traits, and values that can be 
measured. With the Weapons School, a case has been made that values and 
skills are inextricably tied together. When one changes, so will the other. 
Meanwhile, experiences contribute to actions and skills all the way up to the level 
of institutional beliefs. These subsequently affect how the group thinks, trains, 
and ultimately acts. In an ideal world, the Weapons School would operate in an 
environment the Air Force would keep stable, so that effectiveness could be 
measured reliably and consistently. Over the past four years, however, objectivity 
has been increasingly tempered by a “that looks about right” mentality, 
suggesting that either a sense about the importance of maintaining the standard 
has been lost, or that compromise is subtly taking hold. The cadre themselves 
talk about turmoil that results from resource inconsistencies and, in the strategy 
framework, there can be no disguising the importance of resources to meet an 
objective.  
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IV. THE WEAPONS OFFICER’S DILEMMA 
Watch your thoughts, for they become words.     
Watch your words, for they become actions.     
Watch your actions, for they become habits.     
Watch your habits, for they become character.     
Watch your character, for it becomes your destiny. 
Unknown 
A. TYING EMOTION TO OBJECTIVITY 
The genesis of this study was to determine the cause of an unquantifiable 
sentiment and to link it to something that could be adjusted by the school. Since 
the Weapons School is tied to its history and its mission, and has demonstrated 
the unparalleled effectiveness of its methods, it will likely continue to esteem its 
own value system. For those directly responsible for passing the torch to new 
generations of weapons officers the biggest challenge, given their determined 
passion for keeping “the bar” high, is how to keep it high. The resource problem 
highlighted in Chapter III is a major factor in the greatest threat to the Weapons 
School—that threat being denial. 
In a complex system, which is what any one of the WIC syllabi represents 
(never mind all eighteen being coordinated at once), there will be unavoidable 
glitches and compromises. No system can be operated flawlessly. Where the 
Weapons School should exercise ultimate caution, however, is to guarantee that 
its values remain intact and that the cadre who nurture them are reassured that 
their contributions are not in vain. The instructor cadre provides an invaluable 
window on the state of operations. In a shared environment where they live and 
work together, rarely would cadre members display “unprofessional” emotion 
unless a trend of violations insulted their beliefs. Threatening people’s values 
typically provokes conflict, which is why consistent emotional responses should 





                                           
B. EVIDENCE OF DETERIORATION 
The Weapons School’s position is that “‘lowering the bar’ is not an 
option.”25 When asked the contentious question, “how do you perceive the risk of 
the Weapons School lowering the bar?” Weapons School commanders staunchly 
denied the possibility of lowering standards: “I don’t think we should even discuss 
the notion of lowering the bar. Maybe we should change the lateral location of the 
bar, but lowering it is not an option. The warfighting commanders (squadron, 
group, wing, and combatant commands) have come to expect a certain level of 
individual when it comes to putting a grad to work, and if we change this, their 
baseline expectations may not be met.”  
WIC instructors, when asked this question, admitted that the standard 
fluctuates, although their basic attitude was to always try to maintain the highest 
possible ideal. One response indicated that the standard should reflect the 
horsepower of the school—more capability should equal a higher level of 
training, “Our job is to produce the best, most lethal [weapons officers] possible.” 
Insightfully, one instructor noted that “as an instructor I have to be able to still 
make the highest caliber leader and instructor. [Students] now have to be able to 
do more than when I was a student due to mission changes, so the fact they 
might not do something as well as we did does not always insinuate that the bar 
was lowered.” The opinions reflected in answers to this question are firm 
evidence that “resoluteness” exists. Between the lines, however, lurks the 
slippery slope that the Weapons School must avoid at all costs.  
“Tactical formation, Energy Maneuverability, etc., were born [at the 
Weapons School] because someone had the vision to recognize that tomorrow 
will not always be like today. That's our legacy, and we're forsaking it for 
expediency. That's a…crime.” These were the words of a single instructor in 
response to the question of standards—an emotional but gripping response to 
the effects of resource constraints on standards of training. As described in the 
previous chapter, there is an incontrovertible link between the quality of the 
graduate and the inputs to the system. This undeniable linkage combined with a  
25 Carter, 2004. 3. 
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steadfast strength to hold the line means that something has to give when inputs 
fall short. In a simple analogy that all aviators can appreciate, the Weapons 
School is flying precariously on the “power curve.”  
 
C. THE POWER CURVE AND THE WEAPONS SCHOOL 
The Weapons School, as an institution, is in a dynamic environment that 
challenges its ability to conduct its mission to the prescribed standard. External 
influences, such as scheduling and resources, limit the school’s output. Internal 
factors, such as the syllabi and its components, are being modified to optimize 
operations with those external influences in mind. The school’s rate of output and 
standard of output are seeking a state of equilibrium with its environment, much 
like an aircraft flying at a constant altitude. Remember from elementary 
aerodynamics how an air-breathing craft remains in level flight. The aircraft’s 
weight must be matched by the wing’s lift. To remain at a constant speed, the 
aircraft’s drag must be matched by its thrust, or power. Drag changes depending 
on velocity and angle of attack (AOA). As the aircraft increases its velocity, 
aerodynamic obstructions (such as inherent skin drag, external stores, etc.) 
cause parasite drag to increase. The top speed of an aircraft is typically restricted 
by parasite drag. As the aircraft slows down, the wing’s shape produces less lift 
requiring an increase in AOA to maintain level flight. The pilot pulls back on the 
stick to accomplish this, and consequently, the wing produces induced drag. The 
two drag curves together (Figure 4) describe the “power required” curve shown in 
Figure 5.26
On the slow side of the minimum thrust required point (the bottom of the 
curve), as velocity slows and induced drag increases then power must increase 
to keep a certain altitude—this while the aircraft is actually flying slower. If the 
pilot fails to apply power commensurate with the onset of induced drag, the 
aircraft will continue to slow down, the wing will rapidly lose lift and will eventually 
stall. This phenomenon is referred to as “falling behind the power curve.” An 
 
26 Charles E. Dole and James E. Lewis, Flight Theory and Aerodynamics (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000), 70-90. 
 option to applying more power is for the pilot to release the backpressure and 











































Now consider the Weapons School. The standard—the bar—is the 
Weapons School’s altitude. Through continuous feedback with the CAF and 
endless debate over how and why, the bar has been set with great care and 
pride. Given all the reasons why we need the bar set high, the school’s altitude 
must not change. Now, consider the Weapons School’s ability to maintain 
operational performance to be its thrust; this is the power available (straight line 
on Figure 6). The instructor cadre comprises the largest component of the 
organization’s power. They have the ability to mutually adjust, learn from 
inefficiencies, and ramp up their effort when required. Fueling the cadre are 
resources, such as time available, unit manning, support assets, etc. Opposing 
the school’s thrust is drag. In everything we do, we try to minimize those things 
that resist our efforts. Factors that limit our maximum effort can be thought of as 
parasite drag. These include the environment and the inefficiencies of the 
organization’s structure (airspace, scheduling timelines, aircraft turn times, etc.). 
At high output (velocity), no amount of power will be able to overcome certain 
limitations of the system. At lower output, however, the organizational drag 
becomes less significant and less effort is required to produce the same result. At 
this point we could say the organization is optimized for its mission. Meanwhile, 
organizational drag’s counterpart can be thought of as those things that disrupt 
the organization’s effort: an unexpected change to the airspace, inconsistent 
aircraft availability, or instructors called to perform extraneous duties are all 
disruptions that cause the cadre to “pull back on the stick” in order to maintain 






























Figure 6. ORGANIZATIONAL POWER CURVE. 
 
While induced drag doesn’t have an exact equivalent, there is a similarly 
corrosive effect when distractions and inefficiencies are combined with other 
factors. Take, for instance, a squadron trying to accomplish its syllabus when 
suddenly required resources are removed from use. A typical example cited in 
interviews was the trend of unpredictable aircraft availability due to maintenance 
problems. This yields a direct reduction in the “power available,” which 
correspondingly reduces performance. Since the squadron is already at its 
maximum effort but realizes the danger of lost training, it scrambles to 
improvise—a distraction. In the process, anything that caused resistance 
beforehand (other disruptions) becomes a multiplicative factor, exasperating the 
effort. Just as with increasing AOA on a wing, operational distractions and 
disruptions rapidly agitate an already compounding problem. 
This situation should sound familiar. At some point, everyone has felt 
unable to complete his/her tasks or to do as good a job as s/he had hoped. If 
asked to explain how such shortfalls occur, any aviator might reply, “I’m behind 
the power curve!” This is a way to describe having too much to do with too little 
40 
 41 
time, energy, or capability. What do we when we fall behind the power curve? 
Everyone has his/her own solution, but typically solutions fall into one of the 
following categories: we a) work harder; b) find help; c) do less work at the 
expected level; d) do all the work to a lower standard of quality. Every weapons 
officer faces these options on a regular basis. The significance of thinking 
through the implications of this analogy is profound, because when the Weapons 
School itself falls behind the power curve, it is also forced to make a decision—a 
decision that affects its identity and its future value system. 
As one instructor commented, “From the time I arrived until the time I left 
[Jan 2005], I definitely felt like it took more effort to accomplish the same task. 
Then we added more tasks with the introduction of the Lightening Pod and laser 
guided bombs. All the distractions and greater complexity of the mission required 
much more work.” Although it is sometimes not very noticeable (as with the onset 
of induced drag), the required-effort curve can sneak up while valuable indicators 
are hidden from the institution. Because of the work ethic of weapons officers, 
there is always a willingness to work harder before relaxing the standard. In 
many cases, though, the increased effort might hide or even aggravate the true 
nature of the situation. As one phase manager put it, there were so many 
destructive inputs to the implementation of his phase (significant adversary 
fallout, unrecoverable range changes, airshows) that the final execution resulted 
in severe compromises in the standard of training. The tasks of re-planning and 
feverish readjustments caused details to be lost, which in turn resulted in more 
inefficiency, all taking effort away from the training goal. The loss of time 
available as a result eliminated any chance of re-accomplishing the training. 
Nonetheless, the team worked even harder though the gold standard had already 
been lost. In other words, this phase manager and others could not work hard 
enough to deliver the power required to counter the rapidly mounting drag. The 
consequence was none other than a lower standard. 
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The importance of recognizing this phenomenon cannot be overstated. 
Remember what one Weapons School commander said:  
Lack of adequate training days means we squeeze 10 lbs into the 5 
lbs bag. That means we rush things, don't take enough time to 
instruct to the exact level we need to, or we do go to the exact level 
we need to and it turns into a 75 hour week plus weekend duty for 
instructors and students. [It] doesn't create the best learning 
environment and students often just want to check off their 
objectives and move to the next one without fully digesting the 
[mission]. When their postgraduate assignment also demands this 
amount of time, it really puts a burden on weapons officers both 
before and after graduation. 
As pointed out here, weapons officers carry their experiences into the CAF and 
dutifully replicate them. An example of this same problem recurring in operational 
units is the trend of double turning to satisfy flying hour programs. In flying 
training, the training benefit of hot pitting or double turning is very discrete. It 
allows an effective doubling of experience in a slightly shorter time, but steals 
important debriefing time from aircrew. In a system where learning has far 
transcended raw experiential knowledge, the debrief is the most valued part of 
training when combined with actually flying airplanes. A high tempo, particularly 
in training, results in debriefs that are cut short. Added to this, of course, are the 
ever-present non-mission related distractions, manning issues, etc. The drag 
caused by flying hour programs and influences outside the purity of mission 
readiness easily outstrips the power available to many CAF squadrons. 
 Indeed, one CAF commander remarked that his biggest challenge was 
overcoming resource and training limitations to meet Air Expeditionary Force 
(AEF) tasking. In his view, low experience levels combined with an assignment 
length of thirty months or less puts an exceptional burden on the individual and 
the squadron to accomplish two AEF deployments during his/her one 
assignment. Particularly where the stakes are very high (urban CAS), it seems 
contradictory that our training methods would not be optimized for more complex 
missions being flown by less experienced crews.  
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Since experience translates into values, and those values guide our 
actions, it should not be a surprise that the CAF is slowly sliding off the back of 
the power curve as well; after all, the CAF’s weapons officers are learning to 
deny compromise by pulling back on the stick unwary of the impending stall. In 
fact, what should be happening instead is that we recognize the problem for what 
it is and choose the most effective course of correcting it. 
 
D. COURSES OF ACTION 
This power curve paradox is both difficult to recognize and deceptively 
hard to correct. Just by looking at the evidence provided in this study, most 
respondees flatly deny that the Weapons School’s standards are in jeopardy. 
This is indicative of the fact that the bar is extremely difficult to measure from 
class to class and that the thought it might actually be compromised is 
unacceptable. As one instructor put it, “The ‘bar’ has never been consistently in 
the same place for the last 50 years. In fact it is rarely the same place in any two 
consecutive classes in a row.” In some cases, there has been ample justification 
for modifying the standard. When 9/11 occurred and several squadrons were 
called to action, the Weapons School acknowledged the loss of training and 
marched on, having fulfilled a higher duty. But when squadrons are repeatedly 
called to backfill operational tasking (such as Operation Noble Eagle) due to what 
appears to be routine lack of consideration for the importance of syllabus 
stability, this assaults the principles of the school. 
The first step in determining how much slippage does occur is to make 
consistent and measurable comparisons of student performance class after 
class. Proficiency of actions remains the proof of choice in this regard. Ideally, 
this measurement would be as standardized as possible over each syllabus; that 
is, each squadron would measure the same level(s) of training (experiences, 
actions, skills, etc.) and categorize them in terms of the core skills of a weapons 
officer. Preferably, the school would formalize its core traits and values, and 
analyze skills under those categories as well. As analysis moves from skills to 
traits to concepts to values, the more subjective assessment becomes, but at 
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least there would be deliberate and clear evidence supplied from lower echelons 
of examination. With an objective effort like this we would possess a truer 
reflection of our efforts and we would always know where we are in terms of the 
power curve. A suggestion for such data collection is presented in Chapter V. 
Just as when a pilot recognizes his/her predicament of being behind the 
power curve, prompt action is currently a must. As alluded to, there are four 
options to correct the problem:  
1. Increase the work effort 
2. Increase the resources to make current work more effective 
3. Maintain the standard but decrease output 
4. Keep the same level of output but reduce the standard 
Since Weapons School personnel already work in excess of seventy-five hours a 
week at full stride, Option 1 seems to have already been implemented. Option 2 
is currently being employed in reverse, and Option 3—decreasing output—is not 
an option given current CAF demands. That leaves the declining quality of the 
Weapons School’s graduates as the only likely possibility—it’s the only area in 
which there’s any give left—whether the cadre openly admits it or not. At this 
point, a prudent pilot would wish for a more powerful motor, understanding the 
undesirable option of trading altitude for airspeed. In the eyes of the Weapons 
School, reducing the standard is not an alternative. Thus the only sensible choice 
is to go back to Option 2 and reverse the trend of diminishing resources. 
This is easier said than done to be sure, but consider the opinions of those 
commanders who compete for the same resources. The CAF commanders who 
responded represent a mix of fighter and bomber squadrons, and every one 
regards the Weapons School as the CAF’s Center of Excellence. Through their 
comments, it is clear the extent to which they value the contributions of 
graduates, the amount of tactical development conducted by the Weapons 
School, and the traits and values passed down by the world’s finest tacticians. 
Even with their own concerns about readiness and training, they concluded 2-to-
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1 that they would increase their investment (people, support, etc.) to maintain the 
same high quality of graduate. The minority were happy with their graduates, but 
were not able to invest more. When asked how less-than-excellent weapons 
officer skills would affect their squadrons, they responded with comments such 
as, “[The] entire [squadron’s] skills would decline. [The] weapons officer leads the 
development of all IPs, multi-FLs, etc.,” and “Training is becoming the single 
force-multiplier we enjoy over our adversaries.” Here the CAF commanders stand 
firm with the Weapons School in demanding that the world’s premier institution of 
air combat development remains intact. As one instructor put it, “we may be the 
last school in the world that has a standard and sticks to it—if we lose that, we 
might as well close the doors for good.” 
From heritage to values to impending stall, the Weapons School must pay 
close attention in order to make an important choice. As during the years 
following Vietnam, the CAF will hold the Weapons School responsible for the 
ways in which it trains. If this is done in an effective and responsible manner, 
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V. OBJECTIVELY ASSESSING THE GRADUATE 
A. STEP ONE TOWARD OBJECTIVENESS 
Since this study has focused on the path toward achieving a strategic 
goal—the graduate—it makes sense to make use of a system to objectively 
assess the syllabus. This system is already in place for each syllabus, but, as 
this thesis has argued, the output is only as good as the input. The inputs 
(including resources) have been changed and disrupted to the point of making 
objective analysis questionable. If the power curve analogy is correct, then these 
disruptions are actually making the numerical analysis misleading. In order to 
answer the overarching question, is the quality of the Weapons Officer 
decreasing, we must first make that objective system truthful. This chapter seeks 
to solve two inherent problems: 1) How can the Weapons School make use of 
current objective indicators in its case for syllabus stability? 2) What system of 
analysis best describes the standard of graduate being produced? 
The first order of business is to show that the syllabi are affected by 
resource decline and inconsistency in support assets. The school already began 
to compile such data in 2004, but should go further to include any and all 
disturbances, such as: airspace changes inside the planning cycle, deviations in 
the maintenance contract, adversary support fallout, extraneous duties or 
personnel shortfalls, lost time due to airshows, munitions fallout, alert tasking, 
etc. With the occurrence of any such event, the impact would be assessed by the 
primary instructor, phase manager, and/or DO, as to the numerical impact on the 
quality of training. It is important to include not only the first order effect, but also 
the second and third order effects. For example, when a higher priority agency 
injects a late notice airspace restriction, the primary instructor might conclude 
that his/her training quality went from a 10 to a 9. But also, when a certain event 
is not accomplished, the phase manager might also degrade the quality of the 
phase since follow-on events must be compromised in order to make up the lost 
training. The DO might even take this a step further if maintenance is unable to 
provide the requisite spares based on the new configuration requirements. In a 
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truly comprehensive assessment, even the maintenance units (and others) would 
conduct such analyses. The accumulation of penalties would indicate the 
depreciation of the standard based on the original design of the syllabus. That 
delta is roughly equivalent to the induced drag on the syllabus. 
With data such as this the Weapons School would be armed with 
evidence of its predicament. Using this thesis’s argument as to the school’s role 
and responsibility in the CAF, the next step would be to seek a commitment from 
its parent and other support agencies to a period of absolute stability. The 
purpose here would be to determine whether the syllabus without perturbations 
performs to the level expected by the CAF. If so, then we will have determined 
our “control” for future comparisons. In order to establish this baseline for 
measurement, the period of unhindered operation would be approximately three 
iterations. The first execution would work out unforeseen issues, the second 
would secure the baseline, and the third would cinch the objective measurement 
that we all seek. 
 
B. CATEGORIES OF MEASUREMENT 
Only once we have granted the syllabus an opportunity to objectively 
prove its worth as it was designed to do can the Weapons School then conduct a 
comprehensive assessment of its performance. The graduate as an individual is 
the most fundamental level of analysis. The syllabus, though, must perform 
effectively for however many graduates it is responsible for and, moreover, must 
be able to do this consistently from class to class. Thus, one good class does not 
render it successful—it must be able to operate consistently. The basic 
framework for analyzing syllabus performance is similar to the framework 
presented in this thesis: the components of analysis are the ends, ways, and 
means. The levels of analysis are those found in the value system: effects, 
actions, traits, concepts, and values. 
1. Define the Target and the Desired Effects 
The strategic goal is to produce weapons officers. The quality of the 
weapons officer should be objectively specified by the CAF commanders and 
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accepted by the Weapons School commanders. The subjective responses by 
CAF commanders in this thesis are a starting point (pp. 25-27). 
The following steps are iterative and interdependent: 
2. Extract the Value System that will Form the Graduate 
These are the ends. The Weapons School has already identified “core 
skills” and their corresponding standards (p. 24). The CAF commanders are, 
again, active participants in specifying the skill level. This thesis recommends 
going above and beyond skills by recognizing the traits, concepts, and values 
that fully embody the quality of the graduate. Using the value system construct 
(p. 20), we can derive a path that contributes to resolute leadership (and/or other 
values). The suggested WIC value system is found in Figure 7 on the following 
page. 
3. Determine the Best Way to Achieve these Skills 
The Weapons School excels in this regime—since it is the founder of the 
CAF’s training methods, the school’s ability to choose the best training concept is 
implicit.  
4. Establish the Resources Required to Implement the Training 
and Reach the Goal 
The school proposes the means required to execute its plan through the 
ACC syllabus approval process. From the ACC/DO level, the syllabus is 
approved or modified based on command priorities. This thesis argues that the 
Weapons School deserves significant consideration in the apportionment of 
these resources given its role and responsibility.  
 
C. INSTRUMENTS OF MEASUREMENT 
With any of the Weapons Squadrons’ best syllabus set forward, and with a 
commitment to execute as purely as possible, the cadre now has a chance to 
validate their ability to train a candidate to be a weapons officer at the standard 
set by the CAF. As described in Chapter III, not until there is a controlled 
environment in which to execute the syllabus can metrics be compared and thus 
measured. 
 Figure 7. WIC VALUE SYSTEM.
VALUES 
Persistent learning 
Pursuit of perfection         RESOLUTE LEADERSHIP 
Dominant performance 
 
ELEMENTS OF TRAINING CONCEPTS 
 Individual performance   Team performance 
Leadership opportunities  Followership opportunites 
Peer assessment   Hardship 
Non-standard problems with atypical solutions 
 
TRAITS 
Humble     Team player 
Approachable    Followership  
Credible    Open minded 
Social connector   Leadership 
Persistent    Thinker 
 
CORE SKILLS 
Communication for mission briefing / instruction / debriefing 




Tactical advisor to the commander 
Problem solver 
Mentor skills 
Knowledge of dissimilar platforms and joint forces 
Tactical Integration 
Interface with Air and Space Operations Centers 
Knowledge of an organization’s weapons and tactics function 
Organizational skills to manage the weapons shop 





The good news for the Weapons School is that most of the tools for 
measurement already exist and the data is already being collected. With 
consistent repetition, that data would provide meaningful feedback to support this 
thesis. 
Similar to the power curve analogy, the Weapons School can observe 
“control instruments” and “performance instruments.” Control of the Weapons 
School is simply the vector imparted by the leadership—changing the attitude of 
the cadre through the mission statement or “commander’s intent.” The control 
mechanism is thus measurable via the amount or type of effort directed and the 
azimuth of that effort. A simple statement from the commandant and each 
squadron commander would provide a way to link values to concepts, traits, and 
skills. 
The performance instruments indicate exactly how well the school is 
responding to the vector.  
Areas of measurement include: 
1. Rate of Output 
This is the graduation rate based on the needs of the Air Force. Deviations 
here indicate deficiencies in either training effectiveness or the capacity of 
training. This is not to ignore the quality of candidates—reasons for wash-out 
should reveal the point of failure, such as lack of ability, determination, or poor 
judgement. 
2. Capabilities of the Graduate 
Measured are the actual capabilities of the graduate as compared to what 
is desired by the CAF. These are yes/no answers. If the Intelligence community 
demands a list of capabilities, does the 19th Weapons Squadron (Intelligence) 
deliver those capabilities at the desired proficiency? These capabilities should 
link directly to the Weapons Officer Core Skills and any of the adopted traits and 
values. Measurement is tied to the standard of training measurements in the next 
paragraph. 
 52 
3. Quality of Capabilities—The Standard 
The Weapons School’s standard, or altitude, is what we all wish we could 
see on a scale of 1-10. Since turbulence has precluded the accurate reading of 
this instrument, this thesis has taken the “gut feel” of the respondees and 
translated it through a framework of strategy. The anticipated result is that the 
school’s standard is in jeopardy, which respondees feel, but cannot readily see. 
Measurement here comes from tying specific training objectives to 
respective skills, which then tie to traits, etc. Subjective evaluation is important—
fundamental to this thesis is the notion that subjective assessment should match 
the numbers; if not, then the disconnect must be found and corrected before 
insidious decay sets in. 
Figure 7 is used to give an example: a desired value is dominant 
performance in the graduate’s primary mission, Combat Search and Rescue 
(CSAR) for instance. The value (dominant performance) would be measured by 
tracing a path through the traits and skills. Dominant performance in CSAR is a 
result of effective training through techniques involving team and individual 
performance, and leadership and followership opportunities. The traits fostered 
are leadership, followership, team cohesiveness, thinking, and persistence. 
These are readily identifiable in an individual, yet difficult to measure. The skills 
that measure these traits might include cognitive skills, leadership skills, problem 
solving, knowledge of dissimilar platforms and joint forces, tactical integration, 
interface with Air and Space Operations Centers, and mission planning skills. 
Each of these skills correlates to graded items on the student’s gradesheet. 
Since an objective value is assigned to these tasks, the black and white standard 
should be apparent here. Repeated deficiencies in these skills should directly 
identify deficiencies in the traits, etc. Consistently acceptable scores in these 
categories should directly translate into approvable traits, concepts, and values. 
To re-emphasize, if the pressure of environmental distractions causes those 
scores to be waived, delayed, or otherwise modified, then objectivity is reduced.  
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A tool readily at hand to measure the Weapons School’s performance is 
the waiver process. If a student fails to accomplish a task or meet the required 
proficiency level, then s/he must graduate with an approved waiver. This is the 
school’s most immediate basis for argument, since a waiver indicates capabilities 
or performance not accomplished through no fault of the syllabus. If waivers are 
accomplished wholly and accurately, then the numbers would immediately 
highlight the extent to which the standard is being depreciated due to disruptive 
resource issues.  
A previous dilemma for instructors was the need for a student to have a 
particular grade in order to progress. It was often the pressure of the timeline that 
caused instructors to “give” the minimum grade required in order to keep the 
phase/student moving, even though the student’s performance might not merit it. 
This inaccurate measurement skewed the unit’s ability to objectively gauge what 
was the consequence of disruptive factors and who might actually be  
substandard students. The 16WPS in 2004 began scoring the students as 
truthfully as possible—if s/he ended the phase with a 1 (substandard), then s/he 
would be sent to the next phase with increased supervision and documentation. 
Even if these scores don’t warrant an end-of-course waiver, they could be used 
to point to disruptions. The fact that the waiver process records deficiencies in 
the student’s abilities and opportunities is the most effective means of showing 
the CAF that it is not getting what it expects.  
The school’s vector is important because where the Weapons School 
leads the CAF will follow. The cadre is already diligently trying to implement a 
concept of optimized skill-based training. By attempting to extract data regarding 
the value system as well, the Weapons School would have yet another tool for 
ensuring that the hard work of the cadre is achieves its desired end, and helping 
protect the entire school from unrecognized decay. Ever important is 
understanding that every syllabus’s measurement instruments are sensitive to 
their environment. Turbulence and other disruptive factors can easily deceive the 
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VI. LESSONS LEARNED 
Aerial combat is brutally unforgiving. To come in second place is to 
die, usually in a rather spectacular manner…There is nothing 
sophisticated about sneaking up on someone and killing him. Aerial 
combat is a blood sport, a knife in the dark. Winners live and losers 
die. 
Robert Coram from Boyd  
 
Combat of any sort is a powerfully revealing experience. It exposes every 
emotion and brings to the fore the very best and worst of human beings. None of 
us would voluntarily prepare for this role if we did not expect to be the best. To be 
the best, however, means there can be only one. In the realm of air combat, 
none stands above the United States Air Force and this is due in large part to the 
tenacious leadership of the Weapons School. As our nation becomes 
increasingly engaged and warfare becomes more mobile, the USAF will be called 
upon with greater frequency and with higher expectations. As Robbie Risner 
said, complacency kills: the CAF’s standard of excellence cannot afford 
compromise. 
 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
My argument has been that when it comes to determining the 
maintenance of standards, there is no question that comparing objective data are 
critical. The Weapons School machine is complex, however. Since the 
environment is fraught with instability, syllabus assessment does not lend itself to 
easy comparisons or measurement. With syllabi being routinely modified on-the-
fly in response to changing support assets, measuring the standards becomes a 
subjective interpretation of variable snapshots. A community of proud 
professionals such as the Weapons School cadre has a difficult time approaching 
a complex issue without first exhausting all mechanisms under its control. Thus, 
while it is clear that making measurement tools more effective is important, valid 
measurement itself requires a commitment to stable execution. This presents us 
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with a veritable Catch-22: we need stability in order to objectively measure 
changes to the standard over time, yet without being able to objectively 
demonstrate that the standard may be slipping we can’t guarantee ourselves the 
resources necessary to ensure stability.  
In the background, the instructor corps is working so hard to preserve the 
value of excellence that it becomes nearly impossible to step away from the 
madness and see the problem for what it is—a paradox of working harder but 
with less effect, mostly due to depleted and ever diminishing resources. 
Using the framework of viewing the syllabus as a strategy, the strategic 
goal (the graduate) can be seen as a product of objectives (measured by 
standards) plus ways (training concepts) plus means (resources). A well-
developed strategy integrates the three components evenly and efficiently. In the 
course of my research, I posed four questions about the health and future of the 
Weapons School’s strategy.  
1. What Exactly Makes Up the Standards of the Weapons 
School? 
In their most viewable form, standards are related to objectives. Each WIC 
has a syllabus that describes specific training objectives that are tied to actions to 
be completed by the student. Each event is graded according to an experiential 
standard established by the instructors. Over repeated demonstrations of these 
actions, the student is easily evaluated as to his/her skill in a certain type of 
event. These abilities contribute to a set of core skills held by the entire school. 
As described earlier, the core skills are: communications, integration of joint 
forces, large force mission planning, training plan development, and tactical 
leadership. Mastery of these skills is measured by consistent accomplishment of 
actions. A step above skills is a person’s traits. In the Weapons School’s view, a 
weapons officer should be humble, approachable, and credible. Although traits 
are less measurable than skills, they are certainly evaluated and measured by 
the instructors. The most widely held standard, meanwhile, applies to the 
Weapons School’s values. The value system has been constructed through 
decades of trial and via the intellectual pursuit of ideals. The school’s most 
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significant contribution to the CAF is its highly valued standard of resolute 
leadership. Resolute leaders have all the necessary qualities the CAF needs in 
its instructors and thereby help fulfill the Weapons School’s role as a leader in 
the CAF. 
2. Are these Components Truly Under Siege?  
Unfortunately, as this thesis reveals, many of the scenarios designed to 
teach requisite skills and traits to the students are disrupted by changes to key 
resources such as airplanes, hardware, airspace, instructor manning, training 
days, etc. The ability to fairly measure skills thus becomes questionable. Some 
WICs will be able to measure their effectiveness better than others, but based on 
interviews and surveys, there is an undeniable problem with consistency. In 
every response, there was mention of resource deficiencies despite all the efforts 
made to streamline the syllabus requirements. The Weapons School is hard at 
work analyzing objectives and improving training concepts. In fact, a class 
doesn’t go by when this formalized analysis doesn’t happen.  
When looking at the three components of syllabus strategy, just given 
realities, there can be no denying that the quality of each Weapons School 
graduate must also be adjusted to the resource problem. In terms of objective 
measurement, simply looking at the decline of resources and/or the quantity and 
types of waivers indicate that standards are under siege or, in keeping with the 
syllabus strategy identified in this thesis: it is apparent that the ways and the 
ends are giving in to match the means. 
3. What are the Consequences if the “Center Of Excellence” 
Changes Its Attitude? 
Are the ways and ends being flexed too far? Without acute awareness, the 
subtle experiences of compromise will affect the value system to the point of 
affecting the CAF. Just as the Weapons School’s values are built on experience, 
so will they be reflected. If the CAF’s Center of Excellence slowly slips into 
mediocrity, it will be infinitely more difficult to attain success against the next 
adversary to challenge our supremacy.  
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4. What Measurements can Provide Evidence of Slippage? 
The assumption beneath being able to measure the true effect of the 
Weapons School’s training methods is that the syllabi can be executed as 
designed, without turbulence. Otherwise, we have no reliable points of 
comparison over time. Compelling CAF decision-makers to avidly support the 
school’s cause requires presenting them more than just a feeling. They will also 
need to see conclusive evidence in the form of objective data. This thesis has 
provided a convincing subjective argument about the effects of turbulence, and 
goes further to suggest how the school’s quandary can be objectively 
communicated to the decision makers. 
 
B. CONCLUSION 
In the words of one CAF commander, training is becoming the only 
advantage we have over our enemies. The USAF invests more heavily in training 
than does any military service in existence today. From the infrastructure that 
provides realistic scenarios to the exercising of its combat machines, and the 
learning that is squeezed from each experience, the CAF is unparalleled in 
training. Yet, if one looks at the CAF’s crown jewel, one can’t help but note the 
degree to which those training opportunities are being starved of the resources 
needed to fuel them. For the CAF, training as a way of reaching an end is at the 
mercy of means—when, in fact, the strategic goal should define whatever 
resources are required to ensure success. For the Weapons School, and likewise 
for the CAF, the answer to what should be the driver—means or strategic end—
seems obvious. Yet, all indications point to a state of denial that can only result in 
failure. 
It is remarkable that the choice facing America’s Air Force is to increase 
thrust or depreciate its standard of excellence. Yet, ironically, it is thanks to that 
standard of excellence that Weapons School Instructors and squadron 
commanders have flexed the system as far as possible. This thesis aims to 
provide recognition, but without action, stall is inevitable. The Weapons School is 
absolutely integral to the CAF’s pre-eminent status, and its system of training and 
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learning is the foundation for modern air combat. The CAF should easily 
understand the danger inherent in compromising training at the Weapons School. 
To voice the sentiments of the cadre and presumably all members of the CAF: if 
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